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The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
 
1. Introduction 
  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are enormous government-sponsored enterprises, or 
GSEs, that play a central role in U.S. secondary mortgage markets.
1  Together, as of mid-
year 2008, the two institutions held or guaranteed about $5.5 trillion in U.S. residential 
mortgage debt – slightly more than the $5.3 trillion in publicly held U.S. Treasury debt at 
that time.     
Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been the subject of a great deal of 
attention and controversy in recent years.  Each GSE has: faced accounting scandals; 
been criticized for not sufficiently targeting their activities toward low-and-moderate 
income communities and households; and had policymakers voice concerns that they 
posed a systemic risk to the global financial system.
2   
At the heart of these (and other) issues is the GSEs’ incentive structure.  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are publicly traded financial institutions that were created by Acts 
of Congress in order to fulfill a public mission.  These charter Acts imbue the two GSEs 
with important competitive advantages (most notably, implied public-sector support for 
                                                 
1 “Fannie Mae” and “Freddie Mac” are widely used nicknames for the Federal National Mortgage 
Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, respectively.   
 
2 For a discussion of the accounting problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see the results of special 
regulatory examination reports at: <http://www.ofheo.gov/Regulations.aspx?Nav=199>.  For an analysis of 
the GSEs funding of mortgages for low-income borrowers and underserved areas earlier this decade see, 
for example, Brown (2001) and Bunce (2002).  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2005), 





their obligations) and define the scope of their permissible activities.
3  Over time, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac became exceptionally large, profitable, and politically powerful.   
Recently, however, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s singular exposure to U.S. 
residential mortgages – coupled with a thin capital base -- resulted in both of these GSEs 
facing financial distress.  U.S. housing markets became increasingly stressed through 
2007 and resulted in severe disruption to mortgage markets.  Secondary market liquidity 
for mortgages not backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac almost entirely dried-up; and 
GSE-backed mortgages saw liquidity pressure as evidenced by unusually wide yield 
spreads.  These developments resulted in a significant reduction in the availability and 
cost of mortgage credit for homeowners. 
As a result of these developments, the federal government was compelled to 
intervene to stabilize both GSEs and mortgage markets more generally.  On September 7, 
2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship by their federal 
regulator: the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).  Concurrent with this action, the 
U.S. Treasury entered into “senior preferred stock agreements” with each institution 
obligating the federal government to inject up to as much as $100 billion each in Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac.  The Treasury also established a mortgage-backed securities 
purchase facility and a standing credit facility in order to support the residential mortgage 
market.   
  The actions of the FHFA and the Treasury last September stabilized Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac by effectively guaranteeing their debt and mortgage-backed 
                                                 







4  A subsequent announcement by the Federal Reserve that it would purchase 
substantial quantities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac debt and mortgage-backed 
securities during 2009 has further acted to improve liquidity in those markets and bring 
yield spreads back to historical norms.
5 
  The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows.  Section II provides some 
background information about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Section III describes the 
sources of financial distress facing these two GSEs.  Section IV outlines the steps taken 
by the federal government to stabilize these systemically important institutions and also 
presents some evidence relating to the effectiveness of these and other recent federal 
interventions into secondary mortgage markets.  Some concluding remarks are offered in 
Section V.      
 
II.  Who are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac? 
Fannie Mae’s roots are in the Great Depression. The National Mortgage 
Association of Washington, as Fannie Mae was first known, was created within the 
federal government in 1938.  Its business was to purchase mortgages insured by the 
Federal Housing Administration, or FHA, from financial institutions around the United 
                                                 
4 By law, the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac must state that they are not guaranteed by the 
federal government.  See 12 U.S.C. § 1719(b),(d)-(e) (Fannie Mae) and 12 U.S.C. § 1455(h)(1) (Freddie 
Mac).  Nevertheless, as discussed further below, financial markets have long viewed the GSEs’ obligations 
as carrying an “implicit” government guarantee.  The federal government’s recent actions were intended to 
send a strong signal to financial markets that the U.S. would protect the interests of holders of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac obligations on an ongoing basis. 
  
5 The maturities of new debt issues by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also increased as a result of these 
policy actions.  Nevertheless, the GSE’s access to long-term finance remains limited as it has been for all 






6  Fannie Mae was subsequently spun-off in 1968 as a publicly traded company as 
a way to reduce the federal debt during the Vietnam War.
7   By contrast, Congress in 
1970 created Freddie Mac, which was owned by the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks and 
the savings and loans that were members of these Banks.
8  Freddie Mac became publicly 
traded in 1989 as part of the thrift crisis resolution.
9   
Hence, today Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are quasi-public/quasi-private 
financial institutions.  On one hand, each GSE was created by an Act of Congress and is 
broadly charged with providing liquidity and stability to the secondary residential 
mortgage market; with a particular emphasis on housing for low- and moderate-income 
households and/or in areas viewed as historically underserved (central cities and rural 
areas).
10  On the other hand, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been funded with private 
capital and their shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange.  This unusual 
governance arrangement has resulted in two, sometimes opposing, corporate objectives: 
                                                 
6 According to Frame and White (2005), by issuing debt and purchasing and holding FHA-insured residential 
mortgages, Fannie Mae was able to expand the available pool of finance to support housing and also to provide 
a degree of unification to mortgage markets.  During this time, mortgage markets were localized for 
technological reasons as well as for reasons rooted in laws that prohibited interstate banking and restricted intra-
state bank branches in many states during most of the twentieth century.  
 
7 Fannie Mae was replaced within the federal government by the Government National Mortgage Association, 
or “Ginnie Mae,” an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD, that 
guarantees mortgage-backed securities that have as their underlying assets residential mortgages that are 
insured primarily by the FHA or by the Department of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration, 
or VA). 
 
8 See Flannery and Frame (2006) for a history and overview of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, 
which those authors refer to as the “other” housing GSE. 
 
9 According to Frame and White (2005), a major motivation for the conversion of Freddie Mac to a publicly 
traded company was the belief that a wider potential share-holding public would raise the price of the shares 
held by the then ailing S&L industry and thus improve the balance sheets of the latter.  
 
10 Fannie Mae’s mission or “statement of purpose” can be found at 12 U.S.C. § 1716.  A similar statement 





fulfilling certain social policy goals (and assisting related political constituencies) and 
maximizing shareholder value. 
By law, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are limited to operating in the secondary 
conforming mortgage market and their activities take two broad forms.
11  The GSEs’ 
“credit guarantee” businesses involve the creation and credit enhancement of mortgage-
backed securities, or MBS.  This is most often done through each institution’s “swap 
programs,” whereby mortgage originators present pools of qualifying mortgages and then 
exchange them for MBS that represent an interest in the same pool.  The GSEs agree to 
ensure the timely payment of principal and interest on the MBS in exchange for a 
monthly premium known as a “guarantee fee”.  (This process is commonly referred to as 
“securitization” although the credit enhancement structure is much simpler than that 
typically used by investment banks for similar transformations of loan pools into tradable 
securities.)  GSE-backed MBS are very liquid (relative to other asset-backed securities 
and loan pools) and this liquidity facilitates more efficient balance sheet management for 
financial institutions. 
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s second line of business is “portfolio 
investment.”  This involves the two GSEs holding MBS that they have purchased in the 
open market, whole mortgages (purchased from originators under their “cash programs”), 
and liquid fixed-income investment securities.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac largely fund 
these assets with so-called “Federal Agency” debt.  The two GSEs have historically been 
                                                 
11 See 12 U.S.C. 1719 (Fannie Mae) and 12 U.S.C. 1454 (Freddie Mac).  Conforming mortgages are those 
with balances below the legal limits on the size of residential mortgages that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
can buy.  For 2009, the conforming loan limit for single-family properties is $417,000, but can be as high 





highly leveraged with total accounting (book) equity equal to less than four percent of 
total assets.
12   
  While Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s federal charters limit the scope of their 
business activities to the secondary residential mortgage market, they also provide them 
with a number of advantages that result in lower operating and funding costs.
13  First, both 
GSEs are exempt from state and local income taxes.  Second, the Secretary of the Treasury 
has the authority to purchase up to $2.25 billion of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
securities, which is often referred to as their federal line-of-credit.  Third, the GSEs’ issue 
“government securities,” as classified under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which in 
practice means that their securities are eligible for use as collateral for public deposits, for 
purchase by the Federal Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by 
federally insured depository institutions.
14  Fourth, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use the 
Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent, which means that their securities are issued and 
transferred using the same system as U.S. Treasury borrowings. 
  The features of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s federal charters, coupled with some 
past government actions, has long served to create a perception in financial markets that the 
federal government “implicitly guarantees” the GSEs’ financial obligations.
15  This belief, 
                                                 
12 By contrast, commercial banks (as a group) maintain a ratio of total equity to total assets of about ten percent. 
 
13 See, for example, U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1996, 2001) for further discussion. 
 
14 A further implication is that they are exempt from the provisions of many state investor protection laws and 
the registration and reporting requirements and fees of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).   
Notably, Fannie Mae voluntarily registered its stock with the SEC in March 2003 and Freddie Mac did the 
same in July 2008. 
 
15 This perception arises despite explicit language on each GSEs’ securities that they are not obligations of the 
federal government.  U.S. General Accounting Office (1990, 90–91) discusses two past episodes during 
which the federal government assisted troubled GSEs. First, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fannie 




in turn, allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to issue debt at interest rates that are far more 
favorable (better than AAA) than their stand-alone financial strength ratings would 
warrant.
16  This borrowing advantage has been estimated empirically to be about 40 basis 
points; although such estimates vary depending upon the maturity and credit rating of the 
comparison bonds and the sample period studied.
17 The perceived implied guarantee also 
affects the interest rates on MBS that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issue, although the 
advantage is difficult to estimate.
18   
The perception of an implied federal guarantee conveys a subsidy on Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, part of which is translated into lower mortgage rates for consumers.  In 
particular, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s activities result in conforming mortgages’ 
carrying lower interest rates than “jumbo mortgages” with principal amounts above the 
conforming loan limit.  Several econometric studies estimated the effect of GSEs on 
conforming mortgage rates; typically finding the interest rate differential to be about 20-
25 basis points with variation in the estimates depending on the empirical specification, 
data sample, and time period studied.
19   
                                                                                                                                                 
1980s, the Farm Credit System (another GSE serving the agricultural sector) required a taxpayer bailout 
totaling $4 billion.   
 
16 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac long received AA- ratings from Standard and Poor’s in terms of their “risk 
to the government”.  However, these ratings incorporated whatever government support or intervention the 
entity typically enjoyed during the normal course of business.  See Frame and Wall (2002) for a discussion.   
 
17  See Ambrose and Warga (1996, 2002), Nothaft, Pearce, and Stevanovic (2002), and Passmore, Sherlund, 
and Burgess (2005). 
 
18 U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1996, 2001) reported an MBS advantage of 30 basis points, but Passmore 
(2005, p. 9) critiques the approach that generates this estimate and alternatively argues that the advantage is in 
the range of 0-6 basis points.   See also Heuson, Passmore, and Sparks (2001) and Passmore, Sparks, and 
Ingpen (2002) for theoretical analyses of the relationship between GSE securitization and mortgage interest 
rates.    
 
19 For an introduction to this literature, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2001), McKenzie (2002), 





  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been largely free from market constraints on 
their size and risk because of the market perception of an implied federal guarantee of 
their obligations.  The GSEs have become enormous financial institutions – both in 
absolute terms and relative to the mortgage market as a whole.  As of June 30, 2008, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together held almost $1.8 trillion in assets (almost entirely 
MBS and whole mortgages) and had another $3.7 trillion in net credit guarantees 
outstanding – i.e., net of those held in their own portfolios.  This $5.5 trillion in 
obligations represented almost half of all residential mortgage debt outstanding at that 
time.  The two GSEs have also grown much more rapidly than the residential mortgage 
market as a whole over the past three decades.  For example, in 1980, Fannie Mae’s and 
Freddie Mac’s share of residential mortgage debt outstanding was only 7 percent (Frame 
and White, 2005).  
The perceived implied federal guarantee also distorts the GSEs' risk-taking 
incentives in a way that may increase the probability of financial distress.  (A similar 
situation is well-understood in the context of federally insured depository institutions.)  
The idea is that a federal guarantee induces debt holders to accept artificially low interest 
rates irrespective regardless of a GSE’s true default risk.  A GSE can then increase the 
riskiness of its activities – which promise high returns to equity holders if the risks turn 
out well – without needing to share those rewards with debt holders in the form of higher 
coupon rates on their debt.  The GSEs' equity holders thus perceive a greater-than-normal 
benefit from risk-taking.   
In order to maximize benefits to homebuyers and minimize taxpayer risk, the 




Mac.  The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD, long regulated 
the GSEs for compliance with their mission of enhancing the availability of mortgage 
credit by creating and maintaining a secondary market for residential mortgages.  HUD 
was also responsible for establishing goals (and monitoring compliance with the goals) 
for Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s financing of housing for low- and moderate-income 
families, housing in central cities, and other “underserved areas”. Congress formally 
established a safety-and-soundness regulatory and supervisory regime for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in 1992.  The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, or OFHEO, was 
authorized to set risk-based capital standards (subject to important statutory limitations), 
conduct examinations, and take enforcement actions if unsafe or unsound financial or 
management practices were identified.
20  Unfortunately, OFHEO’s structure and 
authorities proved deficient in many respects.
21 
GSE regulatory reform was an active legislative item this decade following the 
accounting scandals at both Fannie Mae (2004) and Freddie Mac (2003).  However, it 
was not until the GSEs came under serious financial strain that reform was passed as part 
of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.  The new law created the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which consolidated the mission and safety and 
soundness oversight for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
                                                 
 
20 Prior to the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, HUD maintained 
exclusive regulatory oversight responsibilities over Fannie Mae and (for 1989-1992) Freddie Mac.  Prior to 
the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Freddie Mac was 
the responsibility of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
 
21 As discussed in Eisenbeis, Frame, and Wall (2007), OFHEO supervised only two institutions making it prone 
to regulatory capture.  The agency was also an independent arm of HUD, which is more focused on promoting 
housing than contending with GSE safety-and-soundness.  OFHEO was also subject to Congress’ annual 
appropriations process and sometimes fell victim to political meddling.  With respect to supervisory tools, 
OFHEO lacked the authority both to adjust minimum capital standards and to resolve a failure of either Fannie 






22  The establishment of the FHFA reflects an improvement in GSE safety-and-
soundness supervision and regulation since the new regulator (among other things): (1) 
no longer requires Congressional approval for its budget, (2) has authority to set 
minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements, and (3) has receivership powers. 
 
III.  Sources of Financial Distress 
U.S. housing and mortgage markets became increasingly stressed during 2007 and 
2008; largely as a result of house price declines in many parts of the country.  Between 
2007:Q2 and 2008:Q3 house prices declined 18.0 percent on a nationwide basis based on 
the S&P/Case-Shiller composite index.  By contrast, over the same period, the OFHEO 
nationwide house price index fell 4.5 percent.  While the magnitudes of decline in these 
repeat-sales indices differ – owing to coverage differences by geography, loan size, and 
loan quality – this national decline in house prices is unusual.
23   
House price declines resulted in a large number of borrowers having mortgage 
balances that exceeded the value of their homes -- a condition often referred to as 
“negative equity”.  Economic theory and evidence suggest that negative equity is a 
necessary condition for mortgage default.
24  Borrowers may face income disruptions that 
temporarily limit their ability to pay and have neither sufficient savings nor home equity 
to cover monthly living expenses.  Other borrowers may default after finding themselves 
                                                 
22 By doing so, the FHFA succeeds the OFHEO, HUD’s GSE mission regulation, and the Federal Housing 
Finance Board. 
 
23 Information about the S&P/Case-Shiller house price index can be found at: 
<http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0.html>.  Information about the OFHEO house price index can be found at: <www.ofheo.gov>.  See 
Leventis (2007) for an analysis of the differences between the two indices. 
 





in a situation where their expectations of future house prices are such that they see little 
hope of attaining positive equity in the foreseeable future.  In any event, the house price 
declines witnessed in 2007 and 2008 have resulted in a tremendous wave of mortgage 
defaults and foreclosures that, in turn, has imperiled financial institutions with significant 
credit exposure to U.S. residential real estate – particularly exposure to rapidly declining 
markets and/or to riskier subprime borrowers and investors.  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac certainly fit this bill, as did thrift institutions operating on a nationwide basis like 
Countrywide and Washington Mutual.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not only singularly exposed to U.S. residential 
mortgages, but also operated with a high degree of leverage, owing to a statutory 
minimum capital requirement of only 2.5 percent for on-balance-sheet assets and 0.45 
percent for net off-balance sheet credit guarantees.  Concerns about the GSEs’ 
concentration of residential mortgage-related risk and leverage were a consistent theme 
raised by Federal Reserve officials throughout this decade (e.g., Greenspan 2005; 
Bernanke 2007).   
As of mid-year 2007 (and prior to the beginning of the financial crisis), Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac maintained book equity values of $39.7 billion and $25.8 billion, 
respectively.  This combined $65.5 billion in equity stood against almost $1.7 trillion in 
combined assets (3.9 percent capital-to-assets ratio) and another $3.2 trillion in net off-
balance sheet credit guarantees.  One year later, the two GSEs had expanded to almost 
$1.8 trillion in combined assets and $3.7 trillion in combined net off-balance sheet credit 
guarantees; but their capital cushions had begun to erode.  During those four intervening 




new equity) and Freddie Mac lost another $4.7 billion.  Moreover, mark-to-market 
accounting losses on ‘available-for-sale’ mortgage-backed securities substantially 
reduced equity through negative entries to ‘accumulated other comprehensive income’ on 
the GSE’s balance sheets.  As of June 30, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac reported 
book values of equity of $41.2 billion and $12.9 billion, respectively.  Perhaps more 
telling was that the GSEs’ self-reported fair values of equity (i.e., the market value of 
assets less the market value of liabilities) as of the same date were $12.5 billion (Fannie 
Mae) and -$5.6 billion (Freddie Mac).
25   
During 2008, significant problems emerged in both of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie 
Mac’s business lines – credit guarantees and portfolio investment. The credit guarantee 
businesses incurred rapidly increasing expenses, largely owing to loan loss provisions.  
During 2006, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together incurred about $1.1 billion in credit-
related expenses.  These expenses rose to $1.6 billion during the first half of 2007 alone; 
and then jumped markedly to $6.5 billion during the second half of that year.  For the 
first half of 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac again saw credit-related expenses almost 
double to $12.8 billion; and for 2008:Q3 alone they totaled $15.3 billion.  Given that the 
ongoing decline in house prices, mounting foreclosures, and the weakening global 
economy, it is likely that the GSEs credit losses will remain elevated for some time.   
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s portfolio investment businesses also suffered 
from mark-to-market losses on mortgage-backed securities held either in trading accounts 
or as “available for sale”.  (Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP, 
                                                 
25 According to Financial Accounting Statement (FAS) Number 157, “fair value” is the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants 
at the measurement date.  For the GSEs’ fair value balance sheets, see: 
<http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/newsreleases/q22008_release.pdf> (Page 17) and 




securities classified as “hold-to-maturity” are not marked-to-market unless there is an 
“other than temporary impairment” to value.)  This was caused by an unusual and 
unforeseen widening of the yield spread between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-
guaranteed MBS and 10-year Treasuries.  Figure 1 presents the current coupon spreads 
on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages (to 10-year Treasuries) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
between January 2007 and July 2008.  The observed widening is believed to be primarily 
caused by the financial market turbulence, which led to a heightened demand for U.S. 
Treasury obligations that was reflected by lower Treasury yields.  However, the 
aforementioned credit problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also likely played a role 
by pushing-up required yields on the GSEs’ MBS.   
Mark-to-market losses also occurred in each GSEs’ holdings of “private-label” 
mortgage securities backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages.
26  As of mid-year 2007, 
the two GSEs held $252.7 billion in mortgage securities backed by subprime and Alt-A 
mortgages -- virtually all of which were rated AAA.
27  The GSEs’ holdings of such 
securities likely reflected at least two factors.  One is the distorted risk-taking incentives 
faced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of the perceived implied federal 
guarantee of their obligations.  Another factor was the HUD-regulated affordable housing 
goals that mandated a certain percent of each institution’s business devoted to affordable 
                                                 
 
26 Private-label mortgage securities are those not guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae.   
Subprime mortgages refer to those loans made to borrowers with riskier credit characteristics, such as 
measured by credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, or debt-to-income ratios.  Alt-A mortgages refer to loan 
made with little or no documentation.    
 
27 Data provided in U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (2008) indicate that, of this 






28  Private-label MBS held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were typically 
backed by a greater concentration of affordable housing goal-eligible loans than their 
own MBS. 
During the summer of 2008, investors became increasingly concerned about the 
financial condition of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Figure 2 illustrates how the 
GSEs’ share prices fell during that time (and following an even more dramatic decline 
during the fall of 2007).  Debt investors also sought clarity from the federal government 
about whether bondholders would be shielded from any losses that might ultimately arise.  
Figure 3 shows prices for credit default swaps on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac senior 
and subordinated debt between January 2007 and July 2008.  Of particular note are the 
spikes in March 2008 (just prior to the Bear Stearns rescue) and then again during June 
and July 2008.  Holders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac senior debt (and MBS) appear to 
have only reacted modestly to the widespread perception of GSE financial distress.   
However, one especially significant and risk-averse investor constituency, foreign official 
institutions, began decreasing their holdings of Federal Agency obligations at that time.  
Figure 4 presents relevant weekly data based on holdings in custody accounts at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
29     
                                                 
28 The GSEs’ housing goals were established in the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and 
Soundness Act of 1992.  The law required HUD to set annual housing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac and to monitor the GSEs’ performance in meeting those goals.  This responsibility was transferred to 
the FHFA as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008. 
 
29 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac account for about 70 percent of all Federal Agency obligations outstanding.   
The other key issuer is the Federal Home Loan Bank System.   
 
The data comes from a memorandum to the Federal Reserve’s H.4.1 release: Factors Affecting Reserve 
Balances.  Quarterly Flow of Funds data (Table L.107) corroborates the trend illustrated by showing that 
foreign official holdings of Federal Agency obligations peaked in 2008:Q2.  Interestingly, the same data 





In response to increasing concerns that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would be 
unable to rollover their debt, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson requested 
that the federal government be given broad authority to invest in the two GSEs.  That 
provision was included in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act that passed in July 
2008. 
 
IV. Federal  Intervention 
According to former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (2009), immediately 
following the passage of the new housing legislation, the Treasury began a 
comprehensive financial review of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conjunction with the 
FHFA, the Federal Reserve, and Morgan Stanley.
30  The GSEs believed in their solvency 
and thought that any capital deficiency below regulatory minimums could be rectified by 
significant asset sales.  Given that U.S. mortgage markets had already been disrupted for 
almost one year at that time, the prospect of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac retrenching 
was not an appealing policy option.   
In early August 2008, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac released their second 
quarter earnings.  As of June 30, 2008 both GSEs were both technically solvent insofar as 
the book value of their equity capital was positive.  (At that time, Fannie Mae had $41.2 
billion in book equity and Freddie Mac $12.9 billion.)  However, there was a compelling 
case that -- on an economic basis -- both were actually insolvent.  First, as mentioned 
previously, the GSEs’ reported fair values of equity were much lower – and in Freddie 
Mac’s case fair value was actually negative.  Second, both institutions were carrying 
                                                 
30 Morgan Stanley was hired by the Treasury to provide market analysis and financial expertise in 




relatively large “tax deferred assets” to allow them to reduce future income taxes.  These 
amounts were $20.6 billion for Fannie Mae and $18.4 billion for Freddie Mac.  If Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were subject to the bank regulatory standard for tax-deferred assets 
– and in light of their extremely weak near-term earnings prospects -- those assets would 
have been written-off and taken total book equity down to $20.6 billion (Fannie Mae) and 
-$5.5 billion (Freddie Mac).
31      
These facts, taken together with deteriorating mortgage market conditions and a 
view that the GSEs had been especially conservative in estimating expected future losses, 
made a compelling case for swift federal action.
32  And on September 7, 2008, FHFA 
Director James Lockhart, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke outlined a plan to stabilize the residential mortgage finance 
market.  This included: (1) placing both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into 
conservatorship; (2) having the Treasury enter into senior preferred stock agreements 
with both GSEs; and (3) establishing two new Treasury-operated liquidity facilities 
aimed at supporting the residential mortgage market -- a mortgage-backed securities 
purchase facility and a standing credit facility.   
The reasoning for the imposition of the conservatorships was that both Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac were financially distressed and could not perform their public 
missions – that is, providing counter-cyclical support to mortgage markets and financing 
affordable housing.  By becoming a conservator, the FHFA assumed the responsibilities 
                                                 
 
31 While acceptable under GAAP, bank regulators require institutions to write-off all but the lesser of: (1) 
the amount of tax deferred assets the institution expects to realize in the next 12 months; or (2) 10 percent 
of Tier 1 capital.  For example, for state member banks, see: 12 C.F.R. 208 Appendix A, Section II(B)(4). 
 
32 Morgenstern and Duhigg (2008) report that Morgan Stanley (working on behalf of the Treasury) 





of the directors, officers, and shareholders of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the 
purpose of conserving each GSEs’ assets and to rehabilitate them into safe-and-sound 
condition.  New CEOs were named to act as agents of the conservator.   
Concurrent with the conservatorships, the Treasury entered into a senior preferred 
stock agreement with each GSE.
33  The purpose of the agreements is to ensure that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac maintain positive net worth going forward.  If the regulator 
determines that either institution’s liabilities exceed assets under GAAP, the Treasury 
will contribute cash capital equal to the difference in exchange for senior preferred stock.  
Each of these agreements is of an indefinite term and for up to $100 billion.  After its 
2008:Q3 earnings release, Freddie Mac drew $13.8 billion.  Both GSEs are expected to 
require significant Treasury capital infusions after the announcement of their respective 
year-end 2008 financials.  Preliminary figures suggest that Fannie Mae will require as 
much as $16 billion and Freddie Mac as much as another $35 billion (Kopecki 2009).   
The senior preferred stock accrues dividends at 10 percent per year; a rate that 
steps up to 12 percent if in any quarter dividends are not paid in cash.  Also, in exchange 
for the senior preferred stock agreements, the Treasury received from each Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac: (1) $1 billion of senior preferred shares; (2) warrants for the purchase 
of common stock representing 79.9% of each institution on a fully diluted basis; and (3) a 
quarterly commitment fee (starting March 31, 2010) to be determined by the Treasury 
and the FHFA (as conservator) in consultation with the Federal Reserve.   
The senior preferred stock agreements require each GSE to begin shrinking their 
retained investment portfolios in 2010 at a rate of 10 percent per year until they each fall 
below $250 billion.  This provision was intended to assuage policymaker concerns about 
                                                 




the GSEs’ investment portfolios, which had become widely viewed as posing a systemic 
risk to the financial system and providing little social welfare benefit.
34  The senior 
preferred stock agreements also included various covenants.  Specifically, Treasury 
approval is required before: (1) purchasing, redeeming or issuing any capital stock or 
paying dividends; (2) terminating conservatorship other than in connection with 
receivership; (3) increasing debt to greater than 110 percent of that outstanding as of June 
30, 2008; and (4) acquiring, consolidating, or merging into another entity. 
The Treasury’s GSE credit facility is for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System and is operated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York.
35  As of year-end 2008, no credit had been extended through this program.  The 
MBS purchase program, by contrast, had accumulated $71.5 billion.
36  Consistent with 
the GSE investment provisions in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 
credit extensions and MBS purchases must be made by year-end 2009 (although 
previously purchased securities may be held beyond that time).   
The intent of the senior preferred stock agreements and Treasury liquidity 
facilities was to provide comfort to Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s senior and 
subordinate creditors and holders of mortgage-backed securities.
37 By extension, these 
                                                 
 
34 See Eisenbeis, Frame, and Wall (2007) for an overview of the policy concerns and the related literature. 
 
35 Credit must be collateralized, can be extended for one-to-four weeks, and is priced at LIBOR plus 50 
basis points.  Eligible collateral is limited to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgage-backed securities and 
Federal Home Loan Bank advances. 
 
36 See <http://www.fms.treas.gov/mts/index.html>. 
 
37 On September 11, 2008, the Treasury issued a press release intended to clarify the status of the senior 
preferred stock agreements.  See <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1131.htm>.  The Treasury 
affirmed that the agreements are permanent and that legislative efforts to abrogate them would give rise to 
government liability to parties suing to enforce their rights under the agreements.  The senior preferred 




actions were expected to lower and stabilize the cost of mortgage finance.  Figures 5 and 
6 illustrate the announcement effect for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 5-year debt spreads 
and current coupon MBS spreads, respectively.  The tighter spreads on mortgage-backed 
securities, in turn, resulted in conforming mortgage rates falling by about 50 basis points.   
  Of course, the two agreements had significant negative consequences for the 
GSEs’ common and preferred stockholders.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac common 
shares quickly fell below $1; down from $60 just 12 months earlier.  Indeed, as a result of 
trading at such low levels, the two GSEs now face delisting.
38  Preferred shares suffered a 
similar fate.  Indeed, several community banks became financially distressed themselves 
as a result of having to write-down the value of their holdings of GSE preferred stock.
39 
The positive bond market reaction, coupled with a relatively smooth operational 
transition, suggested that the imposition of conservatorships at Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac was, so far, a success.  However, by November 1, 2008, mortgage rates and yields 
on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac obligations had climbed back to pre-conservatorship 
levels because of worsening financial market conditions.  Policymakers then searched for 
additional tools to lower and stabilize the cost of mortgage finance.  In response, the 
Federal Reserve announced on November 25 that it was establishing new facilities to: 1) 
purchase up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae; and 2) purchase up to $100 billion in debt obligations of 
                                                                                                                                                 
liquidation; or 3) GSE satisfaction of all liabilities.  In some sense, the senior stock purchase agreements 
have become an appendage to the GSE charters. 
 
38 The NYSE Listing Manual (Part 802.01C) notes that a company will be deemed to be below compliance 
standards if the average closing price of a security is less than $1.00 over a consecutive 30-day trading 
period.  Once notified, a company has six months to bring its share price and average share price above the 
$1.00 threshold.  Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were each notified in November 2008. 
 




Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System.  Figures 5 and 6 
also show a positive market response to these announcements.   
 
V. Conclusions 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in the U.S. residential mortgage 
finance system.  As real estate prices fell and mortgage defaults and foreclosures 
mounted, the two highly leveraged GSEs became financially distressed.  In response, 
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s federal regulator placed both institutions into 
conservatorship and the U.S. Treasury entered into senior stock purchase agreements 
with each GSE and introduced new liquidity facilities aimed at supporting the institutions 
and mortgage markets more generally. 
The federal intervention into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has been successful 
insofar as it improved the confidence of creditors and stabilized residential mortgage 
markets.  However, the current arrangement of government ownership and control over 
these two enormous financial institutions will likely be revisited by the Congress in the 
months ahead.  Today’s consensus appears to be that the previous public-private business 
model is inherently flawed and unstable.  
Indeed it is unclear what role Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will ultimately play in 
the U.S. housing finance system.  And the reasons for this uncertainty do not solely rest 
with the two GSEs. The financial distress at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has occurred 
along with significant and well-publicized problems at a host of mortgage originators, 
private mortgage insurance companies, and monoline bond insurers.  Hence, the federal 




markets.  Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke (2008) and former Treasury Secretary 
Paulson (2009) have offered some initial thoughts about various policy options.   
Nevertheless, additional research and policy analysis should commence quickly about the 
public-sector’s role in mortgage markets, the efficacy of the GSE model of financial 
intermediation, and the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
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